The reported strategy appears intended to provide choices between conventional defeat and a massive strategic nuclear attack.
Instead of immediately striking cities or launching intercontinental missiles, the United States could theoretically use a lower-yield weapon against a military formation, naval force, hardened command center or isolated target. The hope would be to stop an enemy advance, restore deterrence and force negotiations without triggering an all-out exchange.
But this logic contains a potentially fatal assumption: that nuclear escalation can be controlled.
A weapon may be described as “tactical” because of its range, yield or battlefield purpose. The country receiving the strike may not view the distinction as meaningful.
Russia or China would have only minutes to determine whether an explosion was an isolated warning or the beginning of a wider attack. Leaders would be forced to make decisions while communications were disrupted, military installations were being destroyed and additional missiles might already be in flight.
A supposedly limited strike could produce retaliation against an American base. Washington could then answer by striking additional military targets. Each side might believe it was responding proportionately even as the conflict moved closer to attacks on major cities.
The escalation ladder may be easy to climb and impossible to descend.
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